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ADMISSIBILITY AND PROOF OF
RTI DOCUMENTS UNDER THE
INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT
—Gaurav Bhawnani and Aditya Mehta*

Abstract The Right to Information Act, 2005 (‘RTI Act’)
is frequently used in civil and criminal litigation to obtain
government documents. However, the RTI Act is silent about
the admissibility and proof of such documents in a trial.
High Courts across the country have interpreted the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 and handed down conflicting decisions in
this regard. Through an examination of these decisions and a
reading of the provisions relating to documentary evidence,
we argue that copies of public documents obtained under
the RTI Act should be treated as certified copies of public
documents and directly be admitted in evidence. Similarly,
response letters from RTI officials are primary evidence of
public documents and should similarly be admitted without
any corroborating oral evidence. While there might be concerns that this approach might violate the rule against multiple hearsay evidence, such fears are unwarranted. This
approach would not only be correct in law, but would also
avoid unnecessary delays in an extremely overburdened judicial system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The RTI Act and its predecessor, the Freedom of Information Act, 2002,
were introduced to increase access to information and thereby increase transparency.1 The RTI Act provides that, upon a written request by a person, the
designated Public Information Officer (‘PIO’) must supply the information
sought within a period of thirty days.2 This information includes the right to
receive certified copies of documents and records, or to take inspections pertaining to such bodies which are covered under the RTI Act.3
In criminal trials, the RTI Act has been extensively used to obtain information about the investigation process, for instance station diaries, police registers
and logbooks, forensic science laboratory registers, letters written by the police
to various authorities, as well as information about witnesses, such as antecedents. Similarly, in civil suits, the RTI Act has been used to obtain documents,
such as sale deeds, filed with public authorities. Suits against the government,
understandably, see the RTI Act used quite extensively as well.4
Although the purpose of the RTI Act was to tackle corruption and ensure
transparency,5 it is silent on the use of documents obtained thereunder as evidence in courts in the manner laid down by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(‘Evidence Act’). Questions have arisen across courts with respect to the
admissibility and manner of proof of these documents. Courts, however,
1

2
3

4

5

Right to Information Act 2005, Statement of Objects and Reasons; Freedom of Information
Act 2002, Statement of Objects and Reasons.
Right to Information Act 2005, ss 6 and 7.
Right to Information Act 2005, s 2(f). Certain subjects are excluded from the purview of the
RTI Act, including information which would impede an investigation or prosecution. These
exclusions are covered under Section 8 of the RTI Act. However, the scope of this and other
exclusions is not the subject matter of this paper.
There is a catena of cases in which such information has been sought. For instance, see
Rajinder Jaina v Chief Information Commissioner 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3511; Chander
Bhushan Anand v Finance Department of Chandigarh Administration 2009 SCC OnLine CIC
871; Deputy Commissioner of Police v DK Sharma 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4454; Samir Zaveri
v Public Information Officer 2015 SCC OnLine CIC 11875. Also see Central Information
Commission, Some Case Laws on Frequently Sought Information <https://cic.gov.in/sites/
default/files/court%20orders/HCS.pdf> accessed 16 May 2020.
Apart from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, speeches in Parliament also speak of using
the RTI Act to increase accountability. For instance, Dr Manmohan Singh, the then Prime
Minister, in his speech in the Lok Sabha on the day the RTI Bill came to be adopted by the
House, said: “For institutions to be efficient and effective, they must function in a transparent, responsive and accountable manner. This is dependent not only on processes internal to the institutions but also on the ability of citizens and external agents to enforce their
rights, vis-à-vis these very institutions. The Right to Information Bill, Sir, will bring into
force another right which will empower the citizen in this regard and ensure that our institutions and their functionaries discharge their duties in the desired manner. It will bring into
effect a critical right for enforcing other rights and fill a vital gap in a citizen’s framework
of rights.” Statement by the Prime Minister, ‘Consideration of the Right to Information Bill
2004’ (LokSabha, 11 May 2005) <http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Debates/Result_Archive.aspx?dbsl=1402351> accessed 16 May 2020.
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are divided on whether documents obtained under the RTI Act can be led in
evidence and also on how such evidence must be led, if they are held to be
admissible. While some courts have held that RTI documents can directly be
read in evidence, others have either held that they are inadmissible or that witnesses must be examined in order to prove them in evidence. There need to be
uniform rules of admissibility and proof. Documents found to be admissible by
a trial court should not be rejected by the appellate court either as being inherently inadmissible or having been insufficiently proved. This issue is of utmost
urgency for practitioners as it could cause grave prejudice to litigants.
In this paper, we seek a way forward in proving responses obtained under
the RTI Act through a reading of the provisions of the Evidence Act and keeping in mind the need to avoid unnecessary delays in trials. We focus on the
two primary types of responses that are obtained under the RTI Act: (i) Copies
of ‘public documents’; and (ii) Answers or data given by the PIO to queries
that may have been posed by the applicant.6 We advocate that both these kinds
of responses should directly be read in evidence, without corroborating oral
evidence. In an overburdened judiciary plagued by backlogs, the recording of
oral evidence is already an extremely time-consuming procedure.7 Requiring
a PIO or any other government servant to appear in court to prove such documents would be a huge burden on the exchequer and inexorably delay trials.
While undoubtedly normatively desirable, the Evidence Act does not appear
to easily align with dispensing with the examination of PIOs. In 1872, when
the Evidence Act was enacted, such access to government documents was not
conceived of. However, we argue that the correct reading of the Evidence Act
would permit the interpretation that we advance.
We divide this paper into three parts. In Part II, we briefly describe the
scheme of the Evidence Act dealing with documentary evidence. In particular,
we focus on the proof of public documents under Sections 35 and 77 of the
Evidence Act in order to lay the necessary foundation for further discussion.
In Part III, we consider the admissibility as secondary evidence and mode of
6

7

For instance, an application seeking the number of crimes registered in a police station in a
certain year might merely receive the response ‘224’ with no documents annexed. A sample
has been included at Annexure I. As this paper is only concerned with the admissibility and
proof of RTI documents as documentary evidence, samples, models, other kinds of ‘information’ that may be obtained under the RTI Act are not addressed in this paper. Information
obtained in electronic form, for instance, could also be sought to be proved in evidence and
might raise evidentiary issues under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. However, we are limiting the scope of this paper to the two kinds of documents mentioned above because these are
the most common types of responses and issues that routinely arise in courts.
Law Commission of India, Delays and Arrears in Trial Courts (Law Comm No 77, 1978)
<http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report77.pdf> accessed 26 June 2020, 18, 41; Law
Commission of India, Expeditious Investigation and Trial of Criminal Cases of Influential
Personalities (Law Comm No 239, 2012) <http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/
report239.pdf> accessed 26 June 2020, 10.
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proof of copies of documents received under the RTI Act. In Part IV, we consider the admissibility as evidence and mode of proof of responses, answers, or
data received in letters from the PIO. We conclude by arguing that in order to
avoid unnecessary delays in trials and to ensure that accused persons can use
information about investigations, which are usually shrouded in mystery, a liberal approach ought to be taken regarding the admissibility of such documents.

II. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE UNDER
THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
Under the Evidence Act, evidence is of two kinds: oral and documentary.8
Documentary evidence, in turn, can either be primary or secondary.9 A
document is primary evidence when the original document itself is produced
before the court.10 Secondary evidence in relation to documents includes certified copies of the original, photocopies, copies made by comparing with the
original, counterparts of the document and oral accounts relating to the document.11 However, secondary evidence with respect to a document can be led
only in limited circumstances specified in the Evidence Act – for instance,
where the original document cannot be produced because it has been lost or
destroyed or in the possession of an adverse party. Secondary evidence is also
permitted when the copies are those of public documents or are certified copies, that a law specifically permits to be given in evidence.12 It is this type of
secondary evidence that we are largely concerned with in this paper.
To prove a document, whether primary or secondary, it is generally essential to prove two things: authorship of the document and the authenticity of its
contents.13 Typically, the author of the document must be examined to identify
8
9
10
11
12
13

Indian Evidence Act 1872, ss 59 and 61.
Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 61.
Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 62.
Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 63.
Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 65.
When a document is produced in a suit or a trial, the opposing party is first given the
opportunity to admit or deny its contents. If the opposing party admits the contents of the
documents, they are directly read in evidence. Only if the contents or genuineness of the documents is denied does evidence need to be led. See Civil Procedure Code 1908, o XII; Code
of Criminal Procedure 1976, s 294.
In both, civil as well as criminal suits, the process of admission and denial is either mandatory or strongly encouraged across states. For instance, in criminal trials in Maharashtra,
it is mandatory to call upon the opposing party to either admit or deny the documents
under Section 294. AK Gupte and SD Dighe, Criminal Manual- Issued by the High Court
of Judicature (Appellate Side) Bombay (6th edn, Hind Law House 2003) 173. An interesting
example of the process not being mandatory, but strongly encouraged appears in the practice
directions issued for civil suits by the Delhi High Court. The rules state that in case a party
fails to call upon the opposing party to admit or deny documents, that party, even if successful in the suit, may be denied costs for the stage of evidence. ‘Practice in the Trial of Civil
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his handwriting, signature, and the contents of the document. If the author is
dead or cannot be brought to court, any other witness, who is conversant with
the handwriting/signature of the author and can attest to the genuineness of
the contents of the document, may be examined.14 This is considered sufficient
to prove the authenticity of the document such that it can be relied upon by a
court.
There are two kinds of exceptions to this rule. First, no witness needs to be
examined to prove certified copies of public documents, records of evidence
in judicial proceedings, Gazettes, newspapers, Acts of Parliament, and such
other documents.15 Section 74 of the Evidence Act defines public documents
as documents forming the act or records of acts of the sovereign authorities,
official bodies, tribunals and public officers of the legislative, judicial or executive of India or a foreign country. This also includes public records of private
documents.16 Certified copies of public documents can be produced as proof
of the contents of the public documents of which they are copies.17 Moreover,
the contents of the documents are also presumed to be true.18 Thus, Section 77
read with Section 79 of the Evidence Act obviate the need to examine the government official who authored the document as the certified copy is sufficient
proof of the authorship as well as authenticity of the original.19
At this stage, it is also apposite to draw attention to public records of private documents, for instance, sale deeds filed with Registrars. While these are
‘public documents’ under Section 74(2), the certified copy alone is not sufficient to prove these documents. It is well-settled that the certified copy is
merely proof of the fact that such a deed was filed or registered. However, it
is not sufficient to prove the execution of the deed. For this, a witness must

14
15

16
17
18

19

Suits’ in Court Rules (High Court of Delhi) [12] <http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/courtrules.asp>
accessed 23 June 2020.
Indian Evidence Act 1872, ss 47, 67, and 73.
Indian Evidence Act 1872, ss 79 to 85. See Madamanchi Ramappa v Muthalur Bojjappa AIR
1963 SC 1633 (‘Madamanchi Ramappa’); Jaswant Singh v Gurdev Singh (2012) 1 SCC 425
(‘Jaswant Singh’).
Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 74.
Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 77.
Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 79. Section 79 must also be read along with Section 114(e) of the
Evidence Act.
See Madamanchi Ramappa (n 15); Jaswant Singh (n 15). We are grateful to the anonymous
reviewer for pointing out that in practice, some trial courts insist on the concerned officer herself producing the certified copy. In other words, as per this interpretation, Section 79 would
mean that the certified copy is proof of the contents of the original, but that there is no assurance of the authenticity of the certified copy itself. In our opinion, if such a practice were to
be followed, it would be incorrect. Section 77 is unambiguous in stating that a certified copy
is sufficient proof of the original. Simultaneously, Section 76 envisages that officers must provide certified copies to any person who may demand one. Both these provisions ought to be
read in consonance, and not isolation. We are also emboldened in this claim by the fact that
even in cases where the authenticity or contents of the document were called into question,
the Supreme Court has found that it would affect the probative value of the document and not
its admissibility. See Babloo Pasi v State of Jharkhand (2008) 13 SCC 133.
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be examined.20 Throughout this paper, where ‘public documents’ are referred
to, unless the context indicates otherwise, we mean public documents under
Section 74(1) of the Evidence Act, and not public records of private documents
under Section 74(2).
The second exception involves entries made in books of account, public or
official books or registers.21 For such documents, the author need not be examined. As per Section 35 of the Evidence Act, any such entry or record made
by a public servant, or any other official, in the discharge of his duty is relevant and may be proved by any official who can show that the records were
maintained in the ordinary course of official duty.22 Section 35, however, deals
only with relevance of such documents and not their mode of proof. It is quite
possible that a document which is relevant under Section 35 may be proved
through the production of a certified copy as prescribed under Section 77.
Alternatively, to prove such documents, it has been held that any witness, not
necessarily the author or even someone who knows the author’s handwriting,
may be examined to prove the foundational facts that the book or register is
regularly maintained in the ordinary course of duty. If these foundational facts
are proved, the document can be relied upon by the court.
For instance, a frequent example is school registers which record the date of
birth of children. Unlike the birth register maintained by the municipal corporation, it is not a public document. The certified copy, thus, cannot directly be
read in evidence. Instead, the current principal of the school may testify as to
the manner in which the school register is maintained. If he testifies that the
register is regularly maintained in the ordinary course of duty, the contents of
the register are considered to be proved even if the author has not been examined.23 The rationale behind this provision is three-fold: (a) it is often impossible to always find the author, especially in case of entries in public records
like birth registers; (b) it is presumed that such documents are not falsified as
they are regularly maintained and there would be no incentive to falsify entries
at the time they were made; and (c) public officials are presumed to carry out
their duty honestly.24
20
21
22
23

24

Rekha v Ratnashree 2005 SCC OnLine MP 364 : AIR 2006 MP 107 (‘Rekha’).
Indian Evidence Act 1872, ss 34 and 35.
Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 35.
For instance, see Ram Suresh Singh v Prabhat Singh (2009) 6 SCC681 : AIR 2009 SC 2805.
A teacher, who was not employed at the school at the time the relevant entry was made in the
register, was examined to prove the contents of the register and the manner in which it was
maintained. Based on his testimony, and the fact that the entry appeared genuine, the register
was held to be conclusive proof of the child’s age.
For instance, the Supreme Court has often compared Section 35 to the Latin maxim ante litem
motam (‘spoken before a lawsuit is brought’). See Murugan alias Settu v State of Tamil Nadu
(2011) 6 SCC 111; Umesh Chandra v State of Rajasthan (1982) 2 SCC 202.
The genuineness of the acts of public officials and that of documents maintained in the
ordinary course are also found in Sections 114(e) and 114(f) respectively.
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With this brief background, the question of the admissibility and proof of
documents obtained under the RTI Act can now be examined.

III. DOCUMENTS RECEIVED UNDER THE RTI ACT
It is an uncontested position that documents received under the RTI Act,
as photocopies, come squarely within the definition of secondary evidence
under Section 63(2) of the Evidence Act. However, proving them as photocopies would mean that these documents would have to be proved in the manner
prescribed under Section 65(a) to (d), as opposed to 65(f), which pertains to
certified copies as opposed to photocopies. This leads to two time-consuming
procedures in a trial in order to actually read the documents in RTI replies into
evidence.
The first is that, as discussed above, photocopies can only be introduced as
per the Evidence Act in limited circumstances. Before a party can introduce
the document received under the RTI Act, she would be required to prove certain foundational facts: she would have to show to the court that the original
document cannot be produced because it has been lost or destroyed or is in the
possession of an adverse party. The party would, thus, have to produce a witness to testify to this effect.
The second difficulty arises in actually proving the documents received as
a reply to the RTI application. For this, the concerned PIO would need to be
examined. The officer would be required to identify her signature and testify
to the fact that the document is a copy, made by a mechanical process, of the
original. This difficulty would be severely compounded by the fact that the PIO
would be testifying against the interests of his department, in case of criminal
or government litigation. Only after the examination of these two witnesses,
the document may be read in evidence.
Examining witnesses is the most time-consuming part of a trial and is
responsible for long delays. Witnesses are difficult to locate, and once located,
they have to be present on a day when the court has time to conduct the examination. In practice, it is an expensive and inefficient process involving issuance and service of summons and accommodating schedules of the court,
witnesses, and lawyers. The Evidence Act recognizes these issues and allows
for certain evidence to be introduced without the need for witnesses to testify.
Copies of public documents received under the RTI Act could potentially
fall within one such exception: certified copies of public documents may
directly be read in evidence.25 In this section, therefore, we ask two questions
in order to examine whether this exception may be availed of: first, do copies
25

Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 77.
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of documents received under the RTI Act qualify as certified copies under the
Evidence Act; and secondly, whether they can be relied upon without the need
for proving any foundational facts.

A. Are Documents Received Under the RTI Act Certified Copies of
Public Documents?
Section 63(1) defines secondary evidence as certified copies given under
the provisions of the Evidence Act. This has to be read with Section 76, which
defines certified copies as copies of those public documents in the custody of
a public officer which a private citizen has a right to inspect, given along with
a certificate that the same is a true copy. The certificate must also carry the
name, signature, and seal of the officer issuing the copy.26 Therefore, the two
requirements under Section 76 are: first, a person must have a right to inspect
a document; and secondly, there must be a certificate stating that the document
procured is a true copy along with the details of the officer involved.
The RTI Act is the general law with respect to seeking inspection of documents. The definition of the right to information itself includes the right
not merely to obtain copies, but also to inspect documents.27 Thus, the first
requirement is fulfilled. Further, documents received under the RTI Act are
accompanied by a letter from the PIO stating that true copies of the requested
documents are annexed. The annexed documents bear the seal of the Officer
and a ‘True Copy’ stamp. Thus, the second requirement is also fulfilled, and
documents received under the RTI Act, when concerned with public documents, can be considered certified copies of public documents as per the provisions of the Evidence Act.28
26

27

28

Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 76. It reads: “Every public officer having the custody of a public
document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy
of it on payment of the legal fees therefore, together with a certificate written at the foot of
such copy that it is true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be and such
certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title,
and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal; and
such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.
Explanation – Any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty, is authorized to
deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section.”
Right to Information Act 2005, s 2(j). It reads: ““right to information” means the right to
information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public
authority and includes the right to—
(i) inspection of work, documents, records;
(ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or records;
(iii) taking certified samples of material;
(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes or in any
other electronic mode or through printouts where such information is stored in a computer
or in any other device;”
It is interesting to note that parallels were drawn between Section 75 and the right to information by the legislature. The Standing Committee considering the Freedom of Information Bill,
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However, certain issues have been raised in this regard. The High Court of
Andhra Pradesh (‘AP High Court’) in 2013 found that ‘certified copies’ are different from ‘true copies’ supplied under the RTI Act. In Bhaskar Rao v. KA
Rama Rao, a single-judge bench of the AP High Court observed: “Further,
none of the said documents are certified copies and only the Xerox copies
of the documents are certified as true copies under the Right to Information
Act. True copies cannot, therefore, be equated to certified copies under the
Evidence Act.”29 The Court neither provided reasoning for arriving at this conclusion nor stated what the difference between true copies and certified copies
might be.
This decision was considered again by the AP High Court in Datti
Kameswari v. Singam Rao Sarath Chandra.30 The Court in Datti Kameswari
found that, “if a document is obtained under the Right to Information Act from
a competent Authority, it can be asked to be taken as a certified copy if the
original satisfies the definition of public document.”31 In coming to this conclusion, it differed from Bhaskar Rao since the latter had ruled that all RTI documents do not constitute certified copies, without any distinction between public
documents and public records of private documents.32 The Court in Bhaskar
Rao, on facts, also appeared to be concerned with public documents and not
public records of private documents. However, Datti Kameswari ruled that the
observations of the earlier court in Bhaskar Rao were limited to the facts of
that particular case, without elucidating why this was the case. As both judgments are by benches of co-ordinate strength, the earlier decision could not
have been overruled. Instead, an unclear and unspecified distinction was made
on facts in order to arrive at a different conclusion.
In Narayan Singh v. Kallaram,33 the Madhya Pradesh High Court (‘MP
High Court’), like the AP High Court did in Datti Kameswari, concluded that
true copies under the RTI Act are the same as ‘certified copies’. The MP High

29
30
31
32

33

2000 (the predecessor of the RTI Act) heard Mr AG Noorani, who is considered a leading
constitutional expert. The report states: “Shri AG Noorani stated that as per his interpretation
Section 75 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 already had the element of freedom of information.” Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, Freedom of
Information Bill, 2000 (RS 2001, 78), <http://164.100.47.5/rs/book2/reports/home_aff/78threport.htm> accessed 16 May 2020.
2010 SCC OnLine AP 350 (‘Bhaskar Rao’).
2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 389 :AIR 2016 Hyd 112 (‘Datti Kameswari’).
Datti Kameswari (n 30) [9].
At this stage, it is appropriate to recall the distinction between public documents and
public records of private documents (such as sale deeds kept with a Registry). As discussed in the previous part, certified copies of the latter do not prove themselves
and require a witness to prove their execution. Therefore, while certified copies of
such documents would also be ‘certified copies’, the evidentiary value would differ.
Even copies received under the RTI Act must be treated in the same manner. As this controversy has been settled, and is not specific to the proof of such copies received under the RTI
Act, we shall not be addressing it in this paper. See Rekha (n 20); Datti Kameswari (n 30).
2015 SCC OnLine MP 281 : AIR 2015 MP 186 (‘Narayan Singh’).
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Court, however, provided reasons for arriving at this conclusion. It relied on
the definition of ‘right to information’ under the RTI Act34 which envisages
receiving ‘certified copies’ of documents.35 The Act does not speak of true or
attested copies. At the same time, the Court relied on the definition of ‘certified copies’ in the Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines them as copies signed
or certified to be true copies by the officer in possession of the original.36
We believe that the MP High Court has taken the correct approach, considering the earlier discussed statutory provisions. A reply to an RTI application
for a public document amply fulfills all the requirements of Section 76 and,
therefore, constitutes certified copies as envisaged under Section 63(1) of the
Evidence Act. The distinction made by Bhaskar Rao between ‘certified copies’
and ‘true copies’ is falsified by the statute itself. Section 76 of the Evidence
Act itself envisages that a certified copy would bear the endorsement of the
copy being a ‘true copy’ as is the case with copies being issued by PIOs in
practice. Moreover, the RTI Act’s use of the phrase ‘certified copy’ indicates
that the distinction between a ‘true’ and ‘certified’ copy is not in accordance
with the legislative scheme.
Thus, copies of public documents received under the RTI Act are certified copies within the meaning of Section 63(1) read with Section 76 of the
Evidence Act. Once this is established, the Evidence Act allows for them to be
directly read in evidence without any further oral corroboration, as we argue in
Part III(B) below.

B. Can Certified Copies Received Under the RTI Act be Read
Directly in Evidence?
As per Section 77 of the Evidence Act, certified copies of public documents
can be produced directly as evidence of the contents of public documents without the need to summon any witnesses.37 The logical extension should then be
that certified copies of public documents received under the RTI Act should be
directly admissible in evidence without the cumbersome process of having to
call upon the concerned PIO.
Once again, the MP High Court had the earliest occasion to address this
question in 2013. In Mahesh Das v. Neeta,38 a number of documents elicited
through the RTI Act had been filed before the trial court towards the end of
the trial. On appeal, the High Court, without much discussion or deliberation,
concluded that, “if some of the documents or any of them is covered under the
34
35
36
37
38

ibid [7], [8].
Right to Information Act 2005, s2(j)(ii).
Narayan Singh (n 33) [8].
Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 77.See Madamanchi Ramappa (n 15); Jaswant Singh (n 15).
2013 SCC OnLine MP 7230.
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definition of Public Documents defined under Section 76 of Evidence Act, then
in that circumstances, the petitioners shall be at liberty to argue and demonstrate the case on the basis of such documents at the time of final arguments.”39
Therefore, if the document received under the RTI Act was a copy of a public
document and not a private document filed with a public body (like a sale/trust
deed lodged with a registry), it could directly be read in evidence as being a
certified copy of a public document. In 2015, the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana (‘P&H High Court’) in Munshi Ram v. Balkar Singh arrived at a similar conclusion without much debate.40
This conclusion is also supported by that of the AP High Court in Datti
Kameswari. After having settled the question of admissibility as discussed earlier, the Court observed that no formal proof would be necessary to prove the
documents in evidence.41
However, the issue became muddled up soon after. In Reliance General
Insurance Co Ltd v. Sameem,42 the P&H High Court, as in Munshi Ram, was
faced with a copy of a driving license obtained under the RTI Act. The Court
held:
“In my opinion, there is no quarrel with the proposition that a
response elicited under the RTI Act could be a certified copy
of public document if the document is covered under Section
74 of the Evidence Act. But the issue in the present case is
that these documents were merely placed on record and no
oral evidence was led. Had it been a case where an employee
of the appellant had appeared to prove the RTI application
and the reply, it could have been held that the driving license
was fake. But in the absence of any person who appeared to
testify to this effect, and was cross-examined, it would not be
possible to come to the conclusion that the document placed
on record was actually a public document.”43
Therefore, it appears that the Court believed that leading oral evidence as
to the attendant circumstances was necessary in order to establish that the
response was indeed received under the RTI Act. This is similar to the requirements for documents introduced under Sections 34 and 35 of the Evidence Act.
It requires oral evidence not of the author of the document, but of any witness who can speak to the requirements laid down in these sections. Thus, the
applicant who sent the RTI query and received the response or the PIO would
39
40
41
42
43

ibid [2].
2016 SCC OnLine P&H 11166 (‘Munshi Ram’).
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be a competent witness to prove the copies of documents received under the
RTI Act.
A judgment of a single-judge bench of the Bombay High Court in Kumarpal
N Shah v. Universal Mechanical Works(P) Ltd posed further questions.44 The
Bombay High Court discussed the public-private distinction and cited with
approval the conclusion arrived at in Datti Kameswari.45 On facts, the plaintiff sought to mark a number of documents as exhibits in his evidence before
the court. These included both private and public documents obtained under
the RTI Act. The plaintiff could only testify to the sending of RTI applications
and receipt of responses. The Court rightly held that the plaintiff was not competent to prove the private documents when the necessary pre-conditions to
lead secondary evidence had not been satisfied. On the other hand, the Court
went on to state that the copies of the public documents should be considered
secondary evidence and marked as exhibits.46 However, this does not indicate
with certainty what the Court might have concluded if no witness were examined to lay the foundation of the sending and receipt of the RTI application and
whether, in such a case, the Court would have permitted the marking of these
documents as in Munshi Ram and Datti Kameswari.
We strongly believe that the position in Munshi Ram and Datti Kameswari
is not only correct, but also normatively desirable. If the documents received
under the RTI Act are admissible as certified copies of public documents, the
benefit of Section 77 should not be denied. Once established that the documents before court are certified copies of public documents, there is no need
to lead oral evidence to prove the document. The nature and context of RTI
documents is evident from the PIO’s accompanying letter and the seal affixed.
Insisting on the examination of the PIO along with the RTI applicant would
waste the time of the parties, the Court as well as a public functionary thereby
unnecessarily delaying the proceedings and burdening the exchequer.
Direct reading in of documents received under the RTI Act also has a principled justification. Even the Best Evidence rule, which limits secondary evidence to only those situations wherein primary evidence cannot be produced,
creates an exception for certified copies of public documents. This is because
the certified copy has been obtained from a public officer who is presumed
under the Evidence Act to act in good faith and perform her duty in a regular
fashion.47 This suggests that she both has the original primary document in her
custody and that she has properly prepared the certified copy in a mechanical fashion with no tampering. Since the PIO providing the certified copy of
44
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the public document is also a public official for whom the same presumptions would apply, the authenticity of the certified copy of a public document
received from her under the RTI Act need not be doubted.
Our claim is further emboldened by the fact that the presumption of genuineness under Section 79 is a rebuttable one. Similarly, the presumption under
Section 114(e) that an official act here, the issuance of the RTI, is performed
regularly and correctly is rebuttable.48 Consequently, if the adverse party
doubts the authenticity of the documents or of the documents being received
under the RTI Act, the PIO can be summoned to rebut this presumption if
required.
Certified copies of public documents received in reply to RTI applications
must, thus, be read directly in evidence. Having examined the admissibility
and proof of copies of documents received under the RTI Act, we turn our
attention to the second common kind of document – the response letters from
PIOs, often containing answers or data, in the next Part.

IV. ANSWERS OR DATA RECEIVED
UNDER THE RTI ACT
The RTI Act allows an individual to directly seek data from the concerned
PIO. The reply to such an RTI Application will be a letter containing the information instead of photocopies of documents. For instance, an application was
made to find out whether a government servant was on duty on a specified
date and time in order to falsify his claim that he was an eye-witness to an
offence committed at his office. The response, included at Annexure I, merely
states the dates and times at which the person was on duty. Copies of roster
or attendance-sheet itself were neither sought, nor received. This example indicates how such a letter containing information could be of use in a trial or a
suit. This situation is different from those already discussed, as the information
provided is not contained in a certified copy of an existing public document
that can be directly introduced in evidence. Rather, such a letter is an original
document itself, thereby constituting primary, and not secondary, evidence.
To our knowledge, the proof of such letters has never been considered in
isolation. In Munshi Ram,49 such responses were considered along with the certified copies of documents obtained. The document under consideration before
the Court was not only the copy of the driving license obtained under the RTI
Act, but also the response of the PIO. This response letter stated that a wrong
license number was originally allotted by the traffic department but was subsequently changed to a different number. The High Court observed: “A response
48
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through RTI is of a public officer and it is a public document and would
require no further corroboration in the manner contemplated under Section 77
of the Evidence Act.”50
This view appears to be incorrect in placing reliance upon Section 77.
Section 77 is limited to certified copies of public documents, i.e., secondary
evidence of original public documents, whereas responses received from PIOs,
being produced in the form of original letters and not photocopies, are primary
evidence under Section 62. Original documents are always admissible in evidence under the Evidence Act.51
The mode of proof of these documents, however, depends on whether these
documents are considered public or private documents. Private documents must
necessarily be proved in the ordinary course, which in our case would mean
examining the PIO. Therefore, in this Part, we first argue that they must be
considered public documents. However, unlike certified copies of public documents, it is unclear whether the originals of public documents can be directly
read in evidence. Thus, our second question takes us into a decades-old debate
about how primary evidence of public documents, i.e., the originals, must be
proved in evidence. However, our response to this question raises issues of
hearsay evidence. Therefore, this is the final issue that this part addresses.

A. Are Letters from PIOs Public or Private Documents?
The P&H High Courtin Munshi Ram evidently believed letters from PIOs
were public documents.52 This conclusion is also supported by a bare reading
of the definition of public documents under Section 74. Amongst others, documents forming the acts or records of acts of public officers, legislative, judicial,
or executive are considered public documents.53 The response of a PIO, who by
her very designation is a public officer, issued in the course of her duty under
50
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the RTI is surely a document forming an act of a public officer. Accordingly,
the Court found that the document would be admissible.
The public or private nature of letters sent by executive officials was considered by the Lahore High Court back in the 1914 case of Fazl Ahmad v.
Emperor.54 Here, the officer in charge of the village marriage registry had forwarded an entry to the central registry. The entry stated that Mr. A had married Ms. M, who had divorced Mr. F a few months previously. On the next
day, the village official wrote another letter to the central registry to not
take action on the entry forwarded the previous day, as Mr. F had come to
his office and stated that he never divorced Ms. M. The Court observed: “I
do not think that such a report was a public document within the meaning of
Section 74 of the Evidence Act; and if so, under S. 65, no secondary evidence
of its contents could be given and Ex. P.A. should not have been received in
evidence by the Magistrate who tried the bigamy case.”55 Notably, the Lahore
High Court did not base its finding on the obviously poor probative of such
a letter. Rather, it held that such a letter by a public official did not constitute a ‘public document’ for the purposes of Section 74 of the Evidence Act.
Commentators cite this case to claim that letters by executive officials do not
constitute public documents.56 However, this broad claim appears to ignore that
the Court’s decision was based on the peculiar contents of the letter before it.
Leaving alone letters by public officials generally, responses by RTI officials in particular pose a peculiar question. A response to an RTI application
is based on documents in the custody of the government. In the example of the
witness on duty in the government hospital, the PIO would base her response
on a public document, i.e., the attendance muster. Therefore, the response of
a PIO raises issues as it is itself based on other public documents. Two contrary lines of decisions exist in cases involving documents analogous to RTI
responses.
In Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Poonam Keserwani,57 the letter in question
was similar to an RTI response. An officer of the Regional Transport Office
had issued a letter or certificate denying the issuance of a particular driving
license that the person claimed to have in his name. The party that obtained
this letter argued that it should directly be read in evidence as it was a public document. However, the Allahabad High Court held that while the register containing driving license records was a public document, a letter based on
this register could not be considered a public document. It reasoned that this
was because, unlike the letter, the maintenance of the register was statutorily
54
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mandated and further, it could be inspected by the public.58 Several decisions
involving similar letters or certificates by traffic authorities in insurance claim
cases have arrived at similar conclusions.59Analogously, it would appear that an
RTI response, being based on documents or registers, is not a public document.
However, a decision of the Supreme Court involving another analogous document held to the contrary. In Kanwar Lal Gupta v. Amar Nath Chawla,60 the
Supreme Court was concerned with the mode of proof of a chart made by the
police, which was based on reports made to the police by twenty-two different
public officials. Similar to RTI responses based on an attendance roster or the
letter by the traffic department based on a register of licenses, the chart was
not the first record of the relevant information. Rather, the information in the
chart was based on existing records. Moreover, the maintenance of the chart
was not statutorily mandated. Despite this, the Supreme Court held that the
chart was relevant under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and was admissible
as it was a public document. Those opposing treating RTI responses as public
documents could argue that the document in question in Kanwar Lal was not a
letter, but a chart, whereas the other two cases discussed above, considered letters, finding them to be private documents. Moreover, Oriental Insurance and
other decisions regarding letters by traffic authorities, though handed down by
High Courts, are subsequent to Kanwar Lal.
In our opinion, however, responses by PIOs must be considered public documents. The definition of public documents under Section 74 does not specify
the form of the document. It merely states that any document which forms an
act or a record of an act of a ‘public officer’, whether of the executive, legislature, or judiciary, must be considered a public document. It is undeniable
that a PIO is a ‘public officer’. The response letters, moreover, are issued under
a statutory duty. While these responses may be based on other public documents, we are fortified in our view by Kanwar Lal that this fact alone does
not preclude them from being considered public documents. While preparing a
document from another may raise questions about its probative value, it cannot
change its nature from a public document to a private document as the latter
question is based purely on a public officer having prepared the document in
the course of her duty.
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B. How can Letters from PIOs be proved in Evidence?
If letters from RTI officers of the kind given in Annexure I are considered
private documents, the PIO would necessarily have to be examined in order to
prove his signature and the contents of the letter. Ironically, we encounter an
issue if these letters are considered public documents, since then the reply constitutes a primary public document. Two views have been taken with respect to
the proof of original public documents as primary evidence.
The first view is that the author of the public document must be examined
to prove its contents, similar to the proof of private documents. This view
is most clearly expressed in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in CH
Shah v. SS Malpathak.61 The Court reasoned that Section 79, which raises the
presumption of genuineness of the certified copies of public documents does
not apply to the originals thereof. Further, the Court observed that in the process of certifying the document, the officer certifying satisfies himself of the
authenticity and accuracy of the copy. Finally, the Court stated that Sections 67
and 68 of the Evidence Act, which lay down the requirement of proof of signature of the author of the document, do not lay down an exception for public
documents.62 Based on these three reasons, the Bombay High Court concluded
that the author of the public documents must be examined to prove the original
as primary evidence.
As per this interpretation, it would be more difficult to prove an original
public document than a certified copy of the same document (which can be
directly read in evidence), implying that secondary evidence would be easier
to lead. While it is true that no provision a kin to Section 77 exists for public documents in the original, this leads to an absurd result. The Evidence Act
expressly prefers primary evidence over secondary. In fact, Stephen, the framer
of the Evidence Act, appears to have realized this absurdity and corrected it. In
his Digest published in 1885, a few years after the Evidence Act was enacted,
he introduced a Section 74 which does not appear in the Evidence Act. This
section provides that a public document may be proved by its production before
court in the original.63
Moreover, the Bombay High Court’s rationale, that a certified copy is more
reliable than the original as a consequence of the certification, does not bear
scrutiny. The process of certifying a copy of the document does not add any
sanctity to the contents of the document, but merely lends assurance to the fact
that the copy is a true reflection of the original. The officer in custody of the
61
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document need not be aware of the authorship or authenticity of the contents
themselves. Therefore, to state that a certified copy is more reliable than the
original is fallacious.
Additionally, the reason Section 77 grants this privileged position to certified copies of public documents is that the certification is by a public officer
who is presumed to conduct his actions in a proper manner. However, there is
no reason why such a presumption, under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act,
should not be made in favour of public documents in the original as well. Even
the original public document will have been signed and/or executed by a public
officer who must also be presumed to conduct his actions in a proper manner.
Fortunately, a second view has been taken by other High Courts. While not
explicitly referring to CH Shah, the Supreme Court appears to have impliedly
overruled the view taken by the Bombay High Court. As per this second view,
the original of a public document can be proved as primary evidence without
examining any witnesses.
In Kanwar Lal,64 discussed in the previous section, the Supreme Court was
concerned with the mode of proof of a chart made by the police based on
reports by public officers in the discharge of their official duties. The Supreme
Court held:
“The first respondent then contended that if this chart were
treated as evidence, he would be deprived of an opportunity
of cross-examining the CID officers who made the reports or
maintained the official records from which the chart was prepared. But that is no argument, because even if the reports
made by CID officers or the official records maintained by
them had been produced by the Inspector General of Police,
they would have been admissible in evidence under the first
part of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, without any oral evidence as to their contents being required to be given by the
CID officers who made the reports or maintained the official
records (emphasis supplied).”65
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the chart, being primary evidence of a
public document, could directly be read in evidence without the need to examine further witnesses. The Calcutta High Court subsequently observed that this
finding of the Supreme Court amounted to an implied overruling of the position taken in CH Shah by the Bombay High Court.66 Relying on Kanwar Lal,
64
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the Calcutta High Court went on to hold that there was no need to examine a
witness to prove such documents in evidence.
Even prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kanwar Lal Gupta,
the Allahabad High Court took a view contrary to that of the Bombay High
Court. This decision of the Allahabad High Court was, in fact, mentioned by
the Bombay High Court though not followed. The Allahabad High Court had
observed that, “if a certified copy of such a document is admissible without
further evidence, we see no reason why the original should not be presumed to
be genuine when the original itself is produced”.67
Similarly, a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court directed that an electoral
roll, being a public document, may directly be read in evidence.68 The Full
Bench sought assurance for its conclusion in Section 81 of the Evidence Act.
Similar to Section 79, which presumes certified copies of public documents to
be true, Section 81 states that Gazettes, newspapers, Acts of Parliament, and
documents directed to be kept by any person when kept in the form required
by law, and when produced from such custody, are presumed to be true.69 The
Court interpreted Section 81 to mean that all public documents must be presumed to be genuine. As a consequence, the Court held that it was neither necessary to lead evidence as to the origin of the document (or other foundational
facts) nor was it necessary to examine its author.70
The MP High Court also arrived at the same conclusion through an alternate route. The Court purposively interpreted Section 77, stating that it was
enacted merely in order to obviate the need to produce the originals of public documents before courts and thus the originals of public documents do not
require additional proof to be read in evidence.71
Along with the Supreme Court decision in Kanwar Lal, there thus appear
to have been a number of High Court decisions allowing originals of public
documents to be directly read in evidence, similar to their certified copies.72
While each judgment used a different route to arrive at the same conclusion,
the underlying premise is unimpeachable– secondary evidence cannot be superior to primary evidence of the same document.
Consequently, we believe that if RTI letters or responses are considered
public documents, they should directly be read in evidence without requiring
67
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any corroborating oral evidence. Thus, while the P&H High Court in Munshi
Ram arrived at the correct mode of proof, it did so through an incorrect route.

C. Does Reading Directly Public Documents Violate the Rule
Against Hearsay Evidence?
The conclusion that public documents should directly be read in evidence
raises an issue of admissibility although at first glance, their nature as primary
evidence obviates any doubt as to admissibility.
The requirement for oral evidence of the author of the document to prove its
contents is based on the rule against hearsay evidence. Contents of a document
are nothing but statements by its author and thus admitting a document in evidence without examining its author is akin to permitting leading of hearsay
evidence.73 The exemption for examination of the author for certified copies of
public documents under Section 77 of the Evidence Act, therefore, is an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. Though the author is not examined,
the document is not only taken to be genuine in terms of its existence, but its
contents are also assumed to be genuine.
Responses by RTI officials, once again, pose a peculiar question. A
response to an RTI application is itself based on documents in the custody of
the government. In the example of the witness on duty in the government hospital, the PIO would base her response on the attendance muster. The PIO thus
bases her response on other documents and not her personal knowledge. To
read the response directly into evidence would be to assume the genuineness
and truth of the response, and in turn, the genuineness and truth of the documents on which the response was based. In other words, such a response would
amount to ‘multiple hearsay’.74
A statement amounts to hearsay when it is not in the personal knowledge
of the witness. For instance, A says that B told him that B saw X murder Y.
The statement by A before court is hearsay because he does not have personal
knowledge of the fact. If A were to repeat B’s statement to C and C were present before court, C’s statement would amount to multiple hearsay.75 Multiple
hearsay is treated with the greatest skepticism because as the chain of speakers increases, the reliability and accuracy of the statement decreases, much
like a game of ‘Chinese whispers’. The greater the levels of hearsay involved,
73
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the higher the possibility of distortion and falsity. Consequently, in jurisdictions such as the United States of America (‘USA’) and the United Kingdom,
multiple hearsay is not permitted though it would otherwise fall within a usually accepted exception to the hearsay rule. Multiple hearsay is only permitted
when both (or all) the levels of hearsay fall within accepted exceptions to the
hearsay rule.76
A simple example can be seen in the Federal Rules of Evidence in the
United States of America. Similar to Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act,
the Federal Rules of Evidence permit records of activities regularly conducted
like books of account to be admitted directly in evidence, although directly
reading such a document itself is hearsay evidence as seen above. The Federal
Rules add another condition. They state that these documents can directly
be led in evidence only if the record was made by someone with personal
knowledge of its contents.77 This is because if the original information was
not within the personal knowledge of the person making the entry, it would
amount to multiple hearsay. Another example is that of ancient documents. In
the USA, like in India,78 documents of a certain antiquity can directly be read
in evidence, without examining the author.79 However, several USA courts have
held that if the contents of the ancient document were hearsay (for instance, if
the author writes ‘A told me that she got married on March 11, 1895’), that portion of the contents of the ancient document that are hearsay cannot be admitted in evidence.80
Therefore, direct reading in evidence of such letters leads to issues of
admissibility. The question of multiple hearsay does not arise if the PIO is
76
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examined in court, since she can state before court on what basis the information was supplied. The only hearsay involved would be the original public document on which she based her information. On the other hand, if the document
is read in evidence without examining the officer, it would amount to admitting multiple hearsay evidence: the first being admitting the PIO’s response
letter, and the second being the original documents on which the response is
based.
Unfortunately, the judicial treatment of this problem, to our knowledge,
has been non-existent.81 Even the two lines of cases discussed in the previous
sub-section,which considered whether documents analogous to RTI responses
should be treated as public or private documents, did not consider issues
of hearsay. The chart prepared by the police in Kanwar Lal, being based on
reports by other officials, also amounted to multiple hearsay when the authors
of the chart were also not examined. Similarly, in Oriental Insurance, had the
letter by the traffic department been read in evidence it would have been the
second level of hearsay – the first being the register on which the letter was
based. Therefore, we cannot place much store in either precedent to guide the
issue at hand. Courts have taken for granted that an original document must
be admissible and that the question merely revolves around the manner of its
proof, without offering any reasons for the former.
We fill this gap by proposing four reasons for why RTI responses should be
held to be admissible:
First, the fear that an RTI response involves two levels of hearsay evidence
or ‘multiple hearsay’ is partially exaggerated. A common notice in orders of
the Central Public Information Commission reads as follows:
“Under the provisions of the RTI Act only such information
as is available and existing and held by the public authority
can be provided. The PIO is not supposed to create information that is not a part of the record. He is also not required
to interpret information or furnish replies to hypothetical
questions.”82
81
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This makes it apparent that the function of the PIO is merely to reproduce
existing information. The PIO cannot reply with her opinion or inferences
based on the existing information. Even though in such responses, the underlying document is not sought, the PIO is merely reiterating their contents.
Therefore, the function of the PIO is largely akin to that of producing a copy
through a comparison with the original, which is a permissible form of secondary evidence under Section 63(3).
Secondly, in any case, even in USA, the exception to the multiple hearsay
rule is where both levels of hearsay fall under exceptions to the rule against
hearsay evidence.83 For instance, in case of ancient documents, if the hearsay
statement mentioned therein was an ‘excited utterance’ or res gestae, it would
be admissible. Our case is similar. Both levels of hearsay are public documents, which are a recognized exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
Moreover, RTI responses would not be the only instance of multiple hearsay permitted in the case of public documents. For instance, certified copies of
registers of births and deaths are directly admissible in evidence under Section
76.84 However, the Registrar or the keeper of the register makes entries in the
register on the basis of information supplied to her by the parent or hospital.
She is not expected to be present at the birth or death herself. Thus, the entries
in the register cannot be said to be based on her personal knowledge. If the
contents of this register were directly read in evidence, this would also amount
to an instance of multiple hearsay.
Thirdly, the presumption of genuineness under Section 77 extends only to
certified copies of those documents which the public has a right to inspect.85
Thus, the presumption appears to be based on the fact that any falsity would
be easily rebutted through an inspection of the original. Similarly, the right
to information under the RTI Act includes the right to inspect the documents
maintained by the relevant authority.86 Therefore, any falsity in a response
from a PIO could be rebutted with similar ease through an inspection of the
underlying record. The presumption of genuineness of the underlying record
must hence be extended to the reply itself.
Fourthly, it is important to examine why public documents are considered
an exception to the rule against hearsay. This is because of the presumption
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See Mohd Salim v Shamsudeen (2019) 4 SCC 130.
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Right to Information Act 2005, s 2(j).
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that government officials carry out their duties correctly and honestly, without
any reason to falsify these documents.87 The same presumption which attaches
to the making of the original document, also attaches to the function of the
PIO. As a functionary who disposes off hundreds of applications seeking information a year, it must be presumed that she replies honestly and diligently.
Thus, considering responses by RTI officials to be public documents and
directly reading them in evidence raises questions of hearsay. While, precedents are silent on this issue, we believe that the fears of hearsay raised here
are unwarranted.

V. CONCLUSION
India currently faces a daunting judicial backlog.88 The recording of evidence in particular is extremely time-consuming. As a consequence, there has
been a push towards avoiding the examination of witnesses of a formal nature.
For instance, in addition to the pre-existing provisions like Section 77 of the
Evidence Act and Sections 292 to 295 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
Section 291A was introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure to obviate
the need to examine Magistrates who conduct Test Identification Parades.89
Similarly, the use of Section 296 to record the evidence of ‘formal witnesses’
via affidavit rather than in-person has also been increased. In light of the
mounting backlog, thus, there is a clear understanding of the need to change an
antiquated process, especially for ‘formal’ witnesses.
Requiring parties to examine PIOs to prove RTI responses and documents
thereunder would be a colossal waste of scarce time and resources. These
responses speak for themselves, establishing their own nature and origin. To
require witnesses, whether the PIO or the applicant, to lay the foundation for
the same would be to play out a charade to no one’s benefit and everyone’s
detriment.
Further, the aim of the RTI Act was to provide reliable information and
increase transparency in a democracy. Since this information is procured from
the state in the official manner defined by the state, it is absurd that the state
by its laws then insist that a litigant go through a painstaking and cumbersome
process to prove these documents. Given the ample presumptions across the
Evidence Act for other documents concerned with the state, it is unreasonable
that RTI replies meant for transparency should be require a complex procedure
to prove.
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This is even more problematic when considered from the perspective of
a right to fair trial under Article 21. Litigants must often prove RTI replies
that go against the interests of the state in the litigation, and would then be
required to have officials come and effectively testify against the interests of
the department. A frequent example of the above would be documents pertaining to an investigation which officers have sought to suppress but are revealed
through RTI replies. Requiring a police officer to come and prove a reply
which goes against the case of the police itself puts the defense in an awkward
position, for they have to call as their own witness an official who has a clear
interest against them in the outcome of the trial. It is unfair to put a litigant in
such a dilemma when the document has been procured from the state as per its
own regulations to begin with. Such a requirement might even render the right
to information nugatory.
The present issue also brings to focus the importance of the stage of admission and denial, both in civil suits and criminal trials. RTI documents may
often by admitted by the opposing party (presumably the state). If judges
insist on reasons being provided for doubting the authenticity of the documents
in case of a denial, which is not currently the practice, the determination of
whether witnesses need to be examined could become a lot more streamlined.
The law with respect to the admissibility and proof of such documents,
unfortunately, remains unclear. A series of single-bench decisions across High
Courts have only added to the confusion. Legislative or Supreme Court intervention to clarify issues that have arisen, preferably in the direction of foregoing with the examination of such witnesses, would be welcome.

VI. ANNEXURE I
The image below is of an RTI Application that was filed to prove that a witness to an offence at a hospital was, in fact, not present on duty at the time of
the hospital. Names and other details have been redacted to ensure privacy.
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